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Abstract 
This article conceptualises the production of foreign policy bullshit in electoral contexts as a result of 
contending incentives toward ambiguity and specificity. Candidates must speak to widely divergent, 
even contradictory camps and policy ideas to maximise voter share in primaries and elections. At the 
same time, overly broad rhetoric or evasion risks signalling incompetence and unsuitability for office. 
I suggest candidates are thus incentivised to hide the compromise character of their suggestions behind 
hyper-specific rhetoric. Following literature from philosophy and linguistics, this is a form of deception 
best captured by ‘bullshit’, i.e. when the candidate simply does not care too much whether what they 
are saying matches with objective reality but does care that this inattention to truth is not known to the 
audience. I illustrate this dynamic in a case study on the 2015/16 elections. Specifically, bipartisan 
support for a US-enforced no-fly zone in Syria cannot be explained by the tool’s likely utility and 
effectiveness. Instead, I argue that the tool’s value for many candidates lay in its effective 
communication of contradictory policy ideas. The tool allowed presidential hopefuls to appear resolute 
yet responsible, purposive yet pragmatic, idealist and realist, while also signalling specificity and thus 
foreign policy expertise. 
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This article argues that (at times bipartisan) support for unsuitable foreign policy instruments 
is best explained through looking at how candidate rhetoric must strike a balance between 
ambiguity and specificity in US electoral contexts. Ambiguity stems from the need to 
compromise between widely divergent audiences and policy ideas, while specificity signals 
expertise and suitability for office. This articles thus explores the interlinkage between electoral 
politics, rhetoric, and foreign policy (Johnstone and Priest, 2017: 2; introduction to this issue). 
Like other articles in this special issue, it illuminates the incentives and constraints presidential 
candidates grapple with when speaking about foreign policy. 
To this end, following Frankfurt (2005), I develop the concept of ‘bullshit’ in contrast to 
erroneous judgment and lying. I illustrate the electoral dynamics at work in its production in a 
case study on no-fly zone proposals for Syria in the 2015/16 US presidential elections. For the 
candidates, the no-fly zone was valuable because it exhibits military-strategic characteristics 
that render it sufficiently ambiguous to effectively signal diverse, indeed contradictory policy 
ideas. It enabled them to appear resolute yet responsible, purposive yet pragmatic, idealist and 
realist simultaneously. And yet, suggesting it as a seemingly specific policy, perhaps counter-
intuitively, made the detection of its strategic uselessness in Syria less likely. 
A no-fly zone denotes a space within a state’s sovereign territory in which another state (or 
coalition) patrols to deny the use of that (air) space and ensure implementation of whatever 
rules the intervener set to hold therein. It can fulfil multiple strategic functions, including air 
support, punishment and aerial occupation (Benard, 2004: 455). However, numerous authors 
suggest that the no-fly zone is neither strategically optimal nor even appropriate for 
intervention and conflict management, and that it is unsuitable for the protection of civilians. 
Its uses in Iraq and Bosnia supported this claim empirically (Brattebo, 2006; Burg and Shoup, 
1999; Frelick, 1992; Jakobsen, 1998; Roberts, 1993). In the 2011 Libya intervention, the no-
fly zone proved ineffective as soon as it established a shaky status quo, and was replaced by a 
more aggressive air campaign (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012). Authors evaluating the tool’s 
effectiveness (Angle, 1999; Benard, 2004; Francis II, 1999; Gibbons, 2002; Knights, 2011; 
Kramlinger, 2001; Renner, 2011) stress that no-fly zones are ‘insufficient to accomplish the 
desired ends’ in conflict management because of the ‘risk of civilian casualties, environmental 
factors, and the inherent limitations of airpower’ (Renner, 2011: 2). 
When a no-fly zone was suggested for Syria, the US refrained from imposing it largely because 
of geostrategic reasons (Carter and Dunford, 2016; Department of Defense/Press Operations, 
2015; Gutterman, 2013; Johnson and Mueen, 2012: 4; Zenko, 2016a, 2016b). Analysts and 
decision-makers agreed early on that ‘a no-fly zone [was] unlikely to alleviate the suffering of 
ordinary Syrians and may potentially be harmful’ (Beehner, 2016) because it ‘cannot 
effectively counter ground-based lethality’ (Phillips, 2016: 182; also: Carter and Dunford, 
2015; Dempsey, 2013; Lynch, 2012; Nuland, 2011). And yet, the no-fly zone continued to play 
a role in foreign policy debates and had bipartisan support during the 2015/2016 election. Why 
do candidates, knowing that no-fly zones may be ineffective or downright counter-productive, 
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suggest the tool for conflict management and intervention? And what does this tell us about 
how foreign policy proposals are used rhetorically in elections?  
I argue below that inappropriate policies may persist in electoral contexts if they allow the 
communication of usually incommensurable ideas, all the while they cloak this compromise 
character and factual emptiness behind a veil of specificity. The policy’s electoral value 
becomes detached from its military-strategic or other utility in solving the problem at hand; its 
use can then be conceptualised as a form of ‘bullshit’ used primarily for electoral posturing on 
foreign policy issues. In the 2015/16 elections, the no-fly zone was ambiguous in that it could 
signal leadership as well as restraint, moral responsibility as well as the prudence not to risk 
American lives, the belief in the American military’s primacy as well as fear of ‘slippery 
slopes’ and ‘mission creep’. And yet, it sounded specific enough to signal expertise and 
leadership. 
Foreign Policy Bullshit between Ambiguity and Specificity 
Some mismatch between what the US can do and what candidates say they want might be 
expected. Indeed, relevant literature details the promises, half-truths, and outright lies 
candidates communicate when they seek to get elected (Aldrich et al., 2006; Iyengar and 
Simon, 2000; Lesperance, 2016; Milner and Tingley, 2015; Nincic and Hinckley, 1991). 
Candidates do not have the advantages in terms of available information that presidents enjoy, 
so factual inaccuracy may erroneously occur (although, as suggested below, in the example 
here under investigation this seems unlikely for most, if not all candidates). Also, they do not 
(yet) face the burdens of office. They thus have more leeway to suggest improbable or 
impossible alternatives which they deem likely to garner votes. This leeway exists especially 
because foreign policy issues rarely, if ever, dominate elections. Also, the electorate tends to 
lack information on them and prioritise domestic matters (Johnstone and Priest, 2017: 7). This 
allows candidates to emphasise or downplay foreign policy concerns according to their own 
strengths, interests, and perception of the electorate’s concerns, to establish credibility as a 
potential commander-in-chief.  
Still, there are ‘limits to what candidates can get away with’ (introduction to this issue: 5). For 
example, incumbents are measured in their foreign policy performance against their campaign 
promises. Self-interested leaders may want to avoid overpromising during elections as backing 
away incurs audience costs. Similarly, lies are risky, although perhaps decreasingly so in an 
age of fake news and increased polarisation. Suggesting something that the speaker believes to 
be untrue may have short-term benefits but entails risks of being caught out, and having to 
subsequently explain or obfuscate the lie (Downs, 1957; Shepsle, 1972). 
Rather, especially when coercively prompted (e.g. in a televised debate), candidates are 
incentivised to evade answering truthfully, e.g. by bullshitting their way through (Carson, 
2010: 60). ‘Bullshit’ is characterised by a loose connection to truth: a candidate simply does 
not care too much whether what they are saying matches with objective reality, which 
differentiates this type of speech from lying as well as hypocrisy (Meibauer, 2016: 71; Saul, 
2012). The speaker does, however, care that this inattention to truth is not known to the 
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audience (Meibauer, 2016: 71). Bullshitting is therefore connected to an intention to deceive 
on the part of the speaker, namely to misrepresent their statement’s truthfulness (for an 
alternative position, cf. Carson, 2016; Fallis, 2015). The speaker’s performance ‘must maintain 
the pretense of conveying information, hiding his lack of justification for this information from 
the audience, and perhaps even from himself’ (Seymour, 2014: 573). Bullshitting is about 
creating the right impression rather than persuasion or argumentative exchange (Seymour, 
2014: 577). To do so successfully, I argue that candidates must balance between contending 
pressures toward both ambiguity and specificity. This clarifies the function of bullshit in 
electoral contexts as well as its form (Frankfurt, 2005: 1).  
Ambiguous rhetoric avoids being ‘pinned down’ to concrete promises or suggestions, fact-
checked or disproven (Aragonès and Neeman, 2000: 184). Specific stands are then only taken 
in ‘obscure forums, where special audiences demand them and where they are easily missed 
by the general public’ (Page, 1976: 745). Indeed, as many voters lack interest and knowledge 
of foreign policy, some candidates refrain entirely from engaging in detailed discussions about 
it (Johnstone and Priest, 2017: 7–11; Page, 1976: 745). Correspondingly, Frankfurt provides 
the example of a Fourth-of-July speech (Frankfurt, 2005). Foreign policy rhetoric then takes 
on a ceremonial nature, consisting of ‘presidential’-sounding stock phrases which ‘protect 
against reality’ (Wander, 1984: 339).  
Such ambiguity is attractive during elections, when candidates are faced with the difficulty of 
signalling commitment to different ideas simultaneously to maximise their support (Downs, 
1957: 132–139; Page, 1976: 742). This rests on the assumption that rhetoric turns underlying 
ideas into arguments, i.e. ‘into contestable propositions’ (Finlayson, 2007: 552). It can then be 
understood as a conduit of ideas that enables political discourse, which in turn consists of the 
exchange of (at times incommensurable) ideas (Finlayson, 2007: 552; Lakoff, 1995). 
Regarding US foreign policy, for example, after the Cold War the US faced peripheral civil 
conflicts where vital interests were not obviously at stake. And yet, intervention proponents 
continued to make cases for involvement. This had led numerous authors to identify different 
ideational ‘camps’, loosely associated with voter groups and foreign policy elites, that compete 
over the interpretation of geostrategic incentives, interests, and appropriate ends (Gholz et al., 
1997; Mead, 2002; Posen and Ross, 1996). The association of such groups with an ideational 
camp is fairly stable, and may be linked to socio-educational background, economic situation, 
geographic situatedness, or other identity markers (for a review: Aldrich et al., 2006: 478–484). 
Siding with one camp or partial audience over another may be advantageous where it rallies 
one’s base or draws clear-cut differences that play to the candidate’s strengths. However, it 
may incur electoral costs – especially on foreign policy, where electoral preferences are both 
unclear as well as less important. Candidates may thus be incentivised to avoid specificity and 
offer satisficing solutions across ideational camps, not least also because (some) voters reward 
bipartisanship in foreign affairs (Aragonès and Neeman, 2000: 184; Page, 1976: 749). 
However, overly ambiguous and evasive tactics may be problematic. The speaker risks being 
pressed on vague rhetoric, especially in situations where debate dynamics are difficult to 
control (Page, 1976: 749). Audiences may see through well-trodden verbiage because of, albeit 
limited, ‘epistemic awareness’ of electoral dynamics and bullshit production (Meibauer, 2016; 
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Seymour, 2014: 574). Voters may prefer specificity to reduce the uncertainty associated with 
vague positions (Aragonès and Neeman, 2000: 184). Importantly, in the context of elections, 
foreign policy rhetoric is aimed not only at positioning vis-à-vis a counterpart, but also at 
convincing the broader electorate of the candidate’s expertise, authority, character and 
suitability for the presidency (Benoit et al., 2003: 347; Johnstone and Priest, 2017: 4). Where 
specific knowledge and proposals signal competence and expertise on a topic and make follow-
up questions less likely, this provides a rationale for the necessary specificity of policy 
suggestions (Page, 1976: 750). Specificity, however, is difficult to attain in complex 
environments, especially by less experienced or informed candidates. 
The incentives to ambiguity and specificity are usually presented as a trade-off problem 
between contrasting strategies in relevant literature (Aragonès and Neeman, 2000; Downs, 
1957; Rudd, 1989; Shepsle, 1972). Unless in exceptional cases of consensus, there are no 
specific rhetorical devices that allow signalling diverse ideas effectively, i.e. so that they do 
not have to commit to either only one (which may alienate audiences), or too obviously to 
multiple ideas (which runs the risk of apparent contradictions). 
This ignores that candidates may be incentivised to use overly precise suggestions to hide their 
ambiguity and indeed factual emptiness. Proposals thus take on a hyper-specific nature, 
comparable to adverts that use made-up medicinal statistics to flog snake oil. This can persuade 
a trusting audience of the speaker’s evidence for their statements even though that evidence is 
not adequate to standards of truthful speaking: the speaker produces bullshit (Meibauer, 2016: 
75–77). Uncertainty and complexity in the respective issue area makes ignorant or indifferent 
audiences more likely (Seymour, 2014: 578). This increases the likelihood that hyper-specific 
bullshit, i.e. the deceptive invocation of seemingly detailed proposals that hide their ambiguity 
and factual emptiness, is successful (cf. Seymour, 2014: 586). Again, this concerns impression 
rather than factual content. Hyper-specific bullshit helps sell the speaker’s competence because 
it sounds detailed, not because it actually is. The importance of such specific-yet-ambiguous 
concepts in political debates increases the more uncertain actors are about the consequences of 
different policies, as is often the case in foreign policy (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 173ff.).  
I suggest in the below, then, that candidates in the 2015/16 elections suggested a no-fly zone 
not because the tool represents an actual political agenda or solution to the problem at hand (at 
the very least not primarily because it does). No-fly zone proposals instead signal a hyper-
specific catch-all compromise for otherwise insurmountable ideational contradiction. Given 
this incentive structure, it seems likely that once contenders have identified such a rhetorical 
tool, they stick with it even if its real-world implications are outright contradictory to 
geopolitical or tactical incentives, national interests, and conflict management. Candidates are 
interested in obscuring this rationale from their audiences, which fits with the definition of 
bullshit offered above. 
Ambiguous and Specific: The No-Fly Zone in the 2015/16 Elections 
I argue that in the 2015/16 presidential elections, a no-fly zone for Syria had bipartisan support 
not because it was a suitable tool for conflict management, but because it could accommodate 
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critics and proponents of intervention to build wider electoral coalitions. This is precisely 
because its characteristics are inherently malleable and open to interpretation (Meibauer, 2017).  
No-fly zones capture the opponent’s air space and destroy military assets that threaten air 
superiority. In other ways, however, no-fly zones are more limited, and signal restraint and 
passivity. For one, there is an expectation that the tool targets only a specific part of adversarial 
capabilities. It is rule-bound and geographically limited. If the opponent complies with 
prescribed rules and does not threaten air superiority, a no-fly zone seems to be a passive-
defensive instrument. In its narrower interpretation, it freezes a status quo. Theoretically, it is 
easily retractable, yet flexible enough to enable further coercive measures. Most importantly, 
no-fly zones are cheap compared to other tools (e.g. full air campaigns) given infrastructure to 
enforce them (air bases or carriers). They can be implemented quickly all the while own assets 
remain removed from the theatre. There is a clear expectation that no-fly zones rarely result in 
loss of own materiel or life, making their implementation a nearly riskless ‘zero-casualty’ 
mission. This roadmap can be applied schematically regardless of whether the tool contradicts 
factual information. The no-fly zone is deceptively simple but also hyper-specific. Because of 
its malleability, it allowed politicians to rhetorically solve a political problem, namely, to 
express a range of incommensurable ideas simultaneously. Its invocation was thus detached 
from its military-strategic value and indeed from any detailed planning or long-term strategy. 
In the 2015/6 elections the no-fly zone was used to signal catch-all ideational compromise in 
domestic (electoral) politics even though it was not, and could not be, an actual policy option.  
Of course, the no-fly zone need not be the only foreign policy tool that fits these characteristics, 
although its invocation in electoral contexts is surprisingly consistent. For example, in 2007/8, 
the no-fly zone had similarly balanced ambiguity and specificity for presidential candidates. 
Then-candidate Hillary Clinton thought a no-fly zone was needed in Sudan because the 
Sudanese government bombed villages, and downing Sudanese planes violating a hypothetical 
no-fly zone was ‘the only way to get their attention’ (CSPAN/PBS, 2007; Flint, 2007). Under 
the same electoral pressures, the Democrat Obama and Republican McCain campaigns had 
agreed with Clinton (Blanchard, 2012: 27; Lake et al., 2006; Rice, 2007). The no-fly zone was 
also a go-to talking point during the 1991/92 elections contested between incumbent George 
H.W. Bush and Democrat candidate Bill Clinton. The latter sought to criticise the former’s 
reluctant foreign policy in Iraq and especially in Bosnia by endorsing US-enforced no-fly zones 
(Fulwood and Chen, 1992; Horvitz, 1992).  
Still, while sanctions may not be sufficiently active to offer much to intervention supporters 
(and do not evoke the types of military imagery candidates may crave), safe areas, buffer zones, 
security assistance (e.g. training and/or arming rebel forces), and especially Special Operations 
forces and drone strikes may exhibit similar dynamics (Brooks, 2016; Holland, 2012). Here, 
further research might illuminate how military-strategic characteristics map onto electoral 
pressures outlined above. The relative remoteness of air power likely adds to the perception of 
limited risk necessary to bridge between a pro- and an anti-intervention stance. This may be 
connected to specifically American ways of (talking about) warfare (e.g.: Buley, 2007; 
Echevarria, 2014), and thus limit this argument’s generalisability. 
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In 2011, shortly after the Obama administration had implemented the Libyan no-fly zone, 
protesters-turned-rebels took control of regions across Syria (Phillips, 2016; Sorenson, 2016). 
Presumably influenced by the Libyan intervention still fresh on their minds, commentators and 
politicians began debating a no-fly zone to protect protesters against the regime’s increasingly 
indiscriminate crackdown (Phillips, 2016: 65–67). Rebels and opposition groups also called 
for a no-fly zone as they hoped it would provide them with greater freedom to operate, 
encourage defections and further uprisings, and level the playing field (Phillips, 2016: 113). 
Indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets provided the clearest military-strategic rationale for 
a no-fly zone limited to northern and southern Syria.1  
Obama had raised hopes of intervention in Summer 2011, although he seemed to favour 
restraint (Goldberg, 2016). Indeed, intervention had cross-party supporters within the 
administration as well as Congress who disliked what they saw as ineffective ‘aspirational 
rhetoric’ (Munoz, 2013; Phillips, 2016: 178; Thompson, 2013). Their opponents argued that 
with limited interests and a complex situation on the ground, these proponents had failed to 
suggest clear alternatives. Some in the administration worried about another failed state in the 
Middle East through intervention and wanted to stick to a narrative of regional 
disentanglement. When Clinton, Panetta and Petraeus suggested a ‘muscular’ plan on Syria, 
they were ‘shot down’ by Obama’s domestic advisors, and subsequently replaced (Phillips, 
2016: 178; Sorenson, 2016: 97). Beyond contingency plans that also involved a no-fly zone, 
this did not result in clearer strategy (Hafezi and Solomon, 2013). Obama’s non-intervention 
stance regarding the ‘red line’ finally disillusioned intervention proponents (Phillips, 2016: 
169).  
By the time the election campaigns started in 2015/16, possibilities for a no-fly zone in Syria 
were severely limited, to the extent that a no-fly zone would be if not outright impossible then 
extremely costly politically and strategically. Accordingly, popular support steadily declined 
before 2015 (ABC News/Washington Post, 2012; Chicago Council for Global Affairs, 2014). 
And yet, at a time when military intervention against the Assad regime was next to impossible, 
the no-fly zone did not disappear from political debates. Instead, it was presented as a serious 
policy option in both parties’ primaries and the presidential debates. I suggest that, at least in 
this case, this cannot be explained simply by reference to incomplete information or ‘genuine’ 
mistake. Undoubtedly, some of the candidates did not know themselves what exactly a no-fly 
zone was or would mean for Syria. More importantly, they did not particularly care. Rather, 
they cared about what proposing the no-fly zone would signal to voters. The tool became 
shorthand for nuanced but determined, responsible but firm policy. It was sufficiently different 
from seemingly ineffective sanctions. Its past application in Libya lent it evocative potential. 
Candidates across the aisle seeking coalitions across ideational camps in their respective parties 
grasped the attractiveness of an ambiguous yet specific tool. The no-fly zone’s characteristics 
made it ideal for political posturing. 
	
1 For an overview over no-fly zone tactics, see: Harmer 2015. A no-fly zone would have likely relieved rebel 
forces and made humanitarian access easier. However, the conflict was largely fought on the ground. Most civilian 
deaths came from small arms fire and artillery shelling rather than aerial bombardment (Yourish et al., 2015; 
Zenko, 2016a). 
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In the Republican primaries, the no-fly zone was used primarily to oppose Obama’s 
unwillingness to use military force or demonstrate ‘resolve’ against Russia. Of the initial 
candidates, only two opposed a no-fly zone on principle: Rand Paul called it a ‘recipe for 
disaster’, and Ted Cruz suggested the US had ‘no business’ in Syria’s civil war (Kaplan and 
Andrews, 2015). Both aimed at capturing, at this early stage, different ideational camps in the 
Republican party, i.e. the libertarian and non-interventionist, non-establishment wings 
respectively. Most others, as Ben Carson commented, tried to capture a feeling of frustration 
that the US was ‘only reacting when somebody does something’ (Kaplan and Andrews, 2015). 
Chris Christie agreed: 
‘And if you think that a no-fly zone is a reckless policy, you're welcome to your opinion. 
But how is it working so far? As we have 250,000 Syrians murdered, slaughtered; 
millions running around the world, running for their lives. It's not working. We need to 
try something else. And that is not reckless’ ((Washington Post/Team Fix, 2015).  
Per John Kasich, the US should show ‘moral leadership’ and ‘prevent further escalation and 
suffering by civilians and refugees’ through a no-fly zone. Similarly, Marco Rubio demanded 
a coalition-enforced no-fly zone to protect civilians. Lindsey Graham, known for hawkish 
foreign policy positions, had already suggested in 2013 that ‘vital national interests’ were at 
stake, and that a no-fly zone could ‘end the war’ because it would neutralise the Syrian air 
force: ‘We can crater the runways. There are four air bases he uses. We can stop the planes 
from flying. We can shoot planes down without having one boot on the ground’ (Everett, 2013). 
This demonstrated a good understanding of how a no-fly zone operates tactically, but also 
mischaracterised the war and what a no-fly zone could achieve in it.  
Graham called a no-fly zone a ‘great relief’, highlighting humanitarian aspects (Kaplan and 
Andrews, 2015). Christie agreed on the no-fly zone’s role in conflict resolution generally 
(Washington Post/Team Fix, 2016), and doubled down on military aggressiveness regarding 
Russia: ‘My first phone call would be to Vladimir, and I’d say to him, ‘Listen, we’re enforcing 
this no-fly zone […] And I mean we’re enforcing it against anyone, including you. So don’t 
try me. Don’t try me. ‘Cause I’ll do it’ (Kaplan, 2015), even if it meant war with Russia 
(Washington Post/Team Fix, 2015). Even moderate Kasich agreed: ‘You enter that no-fly zone, 
you enter at your own peril’ (Kaplan, 2015). Jeb Bush highlighted the no-fly zone’s 
humanitarian aspects, and how it would help refugee management (Washington Post/Team Fix, 
2015), but also said it should be directed against Russia (Kaplan and Andrews, 2015).  
These candidates’ use of the no-fly zone communicates vague, even contradictory ideas about 
appropriate strategy rather than an actual policy suggestion. For most Republican candidates, 
the no-fly zone ticked all boxes: leadership, resolve, humanitarian responsibility, refugee 
management, opposition to Russia, and no-boots-on-the-ground use of force. The no-fly zone 
became a symbolic tool with a high degree of semantic openness, including abstract ideas in a 
specific manner (Selchow, 2017: 47). As such, it was attractive for those candidates wanting 
to demonstrate their foreign policy credentials while jostling in early polls for moderate as well 
as neo-conservative voters. This included especially Bush, Christie, Kasich and Rubio (CNN, 
2015b). 
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Even candidates who did not originally have a pronounced foreign policy vision had to declare 
themselves: Carson and Fiorina both fell in line, with the latter suggesting the no-fly zone is ‘a 
tricky maneuver, it’s a dangerous maneuver, but it’s a maneuver that we must undertake’ 
(Kaplan and Andrews, 2015; Washington Post/Team Fix, 2015). Even Donald Trump, banking 
on his ‘politainer’ persona rather than convincing voters of his foreign policy credentials, was 
drawn into the no-fly zone debate (Moon, 2019: 2). When prompted, he commented: ‘[A no-
fly zone] does not sound like me very much, but I want to sit back and I want to see what 
happens’ (Kaplan and Andrews, 2015). He later promised to build a ‘big, beautiful safe zone’ 
to stem refugee flows (Key, 2015). By early 2016, Trump was the candidate to beat, and 
dominated Republican foreign policy debates (CNN, 2016a); the no-fly zone’s electoral utility 
waned as it slowly became clear that big-tent Republicanism across ideational camps was a 
losing hand. 
In the Democratic primaries, the candidates also employed the no-fly zone as an empty signifier 
of political position. They aimed to differentiate their respective own stance from the Obama 
administration, while avoiding any notion that further involvement would mean ‘boots on the 
ground’ (New York Times, 2016). This was a problem particularly for Hillary Clinton, the 
Democratic candidate to beat, who used the no-fly zone to signal the resolve to ‘stand up to 
Russia’ as well as a pragmatic policy of refugee management and humanitarian responsibility 
(Seitz-Wald, 2015), to ‘stop the carnage on the ground and from the air’ (Kaplan and Andrews, 
2015). Notably, she thus positioned against what she had expressed in 2013 on the dangers of 
a no-fly zone and the dissimilarity of Syria to Libya (Norton, 2016).  
In the first primary debate, Clinton explained regarding Russia’s president Putin: ‘We have to 
stand up to his bullying, and specifically in Syria, it is important […] And, to - provide safe 
zones so that people are not going to have to be flooding out of Syria at the rate they are’ (CNN, 
2015a). This allowed Clinton to position as a pragmatic diplomat. Later, she added: ‘[Why] I 
have advocated that the no-fly zone - which of course would be in a coalition - be put on the 
table is because I'm trying to figure out what leverage we have to get Russia to the table […]’ 
(CNN, 2015a). She reiterated in an exchange with debate host Martha Raddatz: 
Clinton: ‘[…] [O]ne of the reasons why I have advocated for a no-fly zone is in order 
to create those safe refuges within Syria, to try to protect people on the ground both 
from Assad's forces, who are continuing to drop barrel bombs, and from ISIS. And of 
course, it has to be de-conflicted with the Russians, who are also flying in that space. 
[…] A no-fly zone would prevent the outflow of refugees and give us a chance to have 
some safe spaces. 
Raddatz: Secretary Clinton, I'd like to go back to that if I could. ISIS doesn't have 
aircraft, Al Qaida doesn't have aircraft. So would you shoot down a Syrian military 
aircraft or a Russian airplane? 
Clinton: I do not think it would come to that. We are already de-conflicting air space. 
We know... 
Raddatz: But isn't that a decision you should make now, whether... 
Clinton: No, I don't think so. […] I am advocating the no-fly zone both because I think 
it would help us on the ground to protect Syrians; I'm also advocating it because I think 
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it gives us some leverage in our conversations with Russia […] The no-fly zone, I would 
hope, would be also shared by Russia […]’ (CBS News, 2015b). 
 
Clinton had history regarding no-fly zones; as outlined above, she had suggested one for Darfur 
in 2008. The no-fly zone she proposed for Syria in 2015/16 again signified a catch-all solution 
to political, diplomatic, and humanitarian challenges: specific yet ambiguous, and therefore 
ideal as a soundbite. President Obama observed as much, saying that ‘there’s a difference 
between running for president and being president’ in response to Clinton’s suggestions (Baker, 
2015). In the Democratic primaries, these contradictions did not seem to hurt Clinton: she 
consistently outpolled the other candidates on foreign policy competence; with Bernie Sanders 
a distant second (CBS, 2015a; CNN, 2015c). She also performed best in a cross-poll on foreign 
policy against all remaining Republican candidates in early 2016 (CNN, 2016b). 
Sanders warned of over-engagement and the risks of intervention: ‘First of all, [Clinton] is 
talking about […] a no-fly zone in Syria, which I think is a very dangerous situation. Could 
lead to real problems’ (CNN, 2015a). He would not support a no-fly zone ‘which the president 
certainly does not support’ because ‘it will cost an enormous sum of money [and] runs the risk 
of getting us sucked into perpetual warfare in that region’ (Washington Post/Team Fix, 2016b). 
This attacked the flank Clinton left open. Sanders could portray her as a reckless warmonger, 
a trope already established for Clinton, deflecting from his own, ambiguous position. It also 
allowed him to emphasise domestic economic policies, where he had apparent strengths and 
could offer detailed proposals. In similar contrast to Clinton, Martin O’Malley presented as 
pragmatist in line with Obama to win primary voters by association:  
‘I believe that, as president, I would not be so quick to pull for a military tool. I believe 
that a no-fly zone in Syria […] would be a mistake. You have to enforce no-fly zones, 
and I believe, especially with the Russian air force in the air, it could lead to an 
escalation because of an accident […]. I support President Obama. I think we have to 
play a long game’ (CNN, 2015a). 
In the debates between Clinton and Trump, the no-fly zone continued to be a favourite policy 
position and a go-to talking point. Clinton tied the humanitarian situation in Syria to Russian 
involvement. She advocated for a no-fly zone ‘not only to help protect the Syrians and prevent 
the constant outflow of refugees, but to frankly gain some leverage on both the Syrian 
government and the Russians’ (Politico, 2016b). She explained that ‘we need some leverage 
with the Russians because they are not going to come to the negotiating table for a diplomatic 
resolution unless there is leverage over them […] I want to emphasize that what is at stake here 
is the ambitions and aggressiveness of Russia’ (Politico, 2016b).  
Clinton knew the Obama administration’s rationale for not using the no-fly zone: geostrategic 
constraints made intervening against Russia in Syria prohibitively risky. Indeed, senior Obama 
administration officials doubted that she would ever implement her stance (Jaffe, 2016; Wong, 
2016). When pushed on this contradiction and whether she would down Russian planes 
violating a no-fly zone, Clinton insisted:  
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‘[…] I think a no-fly zone could save lives and hasten the end of the conflict. I am well 
aware of the really legitimate concerns you have expressed from both the president and 
the general. This would not be done just on the first day. This would take a lot of 
negotiation and it would also take making it clear to the Russians and the Syrians that 
our purpose is to provide safe zones on the ground […] So I think we could strike a deal 
and make it very clear to the Russians and Syrians that this was something that we 
believe the best interests of the people on the ground […] It would help us in the fight 
against ISIS’ (Politico, 2016b)  
It is the inherent flexibility of the no-fly zone, its limited yet forceful character that makes it a 
perfect political soundbite. In this, it differs both from sanctions as well as tools often perceived 
as more aggressive, like drone strikes. For Clinton, the tool stands for an interventionist, yet 
responsible policy. In one sweep, the no-fly zone can solve all problems in Syria: it seemed an 
appropriate way to signal protection of civilians, coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis Russia, solving 
the refugee crisis as well as determination to fight ISIS, without having to commit to any actual 
conflict resolution strategy. Trump, in his own way, seemed to express something similar:  
‘She talks really tough against Putin and against Assad. She talks in favor of the rebels. 
She doesn't even know who the rebels are. […] Every time we take rebels whether it's 
in Iraq or anywhere else, we’re arming people. And you know what happens? They end 
up being worse than the people. Look at what she did in Libya with Qaddafi […] It's a 
mess’ (Politico, 2016a). 
Still, Clinton’s perceived expertise and leadership on foreign policy and on Syria consistently 
outpolled Trump (NBC News/WSJ, 2016; Fox News, 2016). Whether to intervene against 
Assad divided even the Republican ticket (Politico, 2016a). The 2015/6 debates saw a 
disconnect between the likelihood that the tool could be employed, and the way candidates 
continued to present it as a policy option. This may mark the full shift of the no-fly zone from 
a military-strategic tool to shorthand used to signal compromise between contrasting political 
positions. 
In electoral contexts, the no-fly zone has grown into a particular role – because of its 
characteristics, the tool appears attractive to candidates intent on disentangling themselves 
from ideational divides. The no-fly zone could not easily be portrayed as a policy option for 
Syria. And yet, that is what candidates across the bipartisan divide tried to do. The no-fly zone 
has become a compromise solution to foreign policy issues in which unclear interests, concern 
about risky over-extension combine with ideational commitments to leadership, humanitarian 
responsibility, and belief in technological superiority. Rhetorical use of the tool was detached 
from its military-strategic value. No-fly zone proposals were foreign policy bullshit, hyper-
specific to hide their compromise character and factual emptiness behind a veil of seemingly 
impressive detail. 
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Contrasting pressures to ambiguity and specificity in electoral contexts incentivise candidates 
to produce bullshit by means of hyper-specific policy proposals. Those are aimed at bridging 
between insurmountable ideational divides and signalling issue expertise and suitability for 
office. In so seeing to maximise potential voter shares, candidates do not (primarily) care 
whether their proposal actually solves the political issue at hand.  
I illustrated this electoral dynamic in a case study on no-fly zone proposals in the 2015/16 
presidential elections. The no-fly zone allowed candidates to pander to both proponents and 
opponents of intervention, specifically to the different ideas they hold, simultaneously. It took 
on an idealised, symbolic nature in political debate which makes it attractive as a political 
‘keyword’ (Selchow, 2017: 48). This was especially important for candidates who needed to 
keep together broad electoral coalitions, e.g. in the case of the Democratic party, liberal elites 
as well as more domestically oriented voter groups. Employing no-fly zones avoided the 
trappings of empty rhetoric when faced with an epistemically aware audience: namely, it was 
a specific suggestion, which signalled expertise and (thereby) suitability for office. This need 
for specificity may well be pertinent for Trump’s challengers in the 2020 election, as evinced 
by the popularity of, e.g. Elizabeth Warren’s detailed planning focus. 
Indeed, this dynamic has consequences beyond electoral politics, most notably where no-fly 
zones and similar tools are actually employed (rather than only promised). Where the routine 
invocation of no-fly zones as a form of American military power serve to convince important 
parts of the American public that intervention can be pursued on the cheap, and in ways that 
appeal to liberals interested in multilateral leadership and humanitarian responsibility, 
neoconservatives seeking democracy promotion and primacy, as well as those inclined to no-
boots-on-the-ground restraint and isolationism, they reproduce a consensus around liberal 
hegemony. They may also be emblematic of the marginalisation of diplomacy and 
naturalisation of permanent warfare observed elsewhere (Brooks, 2016; Holland, 2012; Walt, 
2018).2 
My aim is not to suggest simplistically that all candidates are liars or cynical populists. Rather, 
pressures toward both ambiguity and specificity make the production of foreign policy bullshit 
more likely. Such deceptive rhetoric is thus the output of incentives embedded in the electoral 
system. Where successful, it legitimises untruthfulness, erodes the quality of public debate, and 
is thus harmful to a functioning democracy. In turn, uncritical, indifferent or ignorant audiences 
make it difficult to hold candidates to account (Seymour, 2014: 575). Electoral dynamics that 
incentivise candidates to latch onto nonsensical proposals because they appeal to their 
audiences is problematic where the institutionalised feedback mechanisms, i.e. media 
coverage, audience backlash and electoral defeat, are not operating well enough. Evidently, 
whether candidates suggested no-fly zones did not solely determine their electoral success. 
However, the combination of ideational sincerity, looseness with truth and hyper-specificity 
can accumulate to harm the credibility of the democratic process. It can also perpetuate false 
perceptions of America’s role in the world, its interests and actions. If impression management 
	
2	I thank Reviewer 1 for this point.	
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rather than genuine argumentation predominates elections, the electoral process is more open 
to takeover by populists, hypocrites and amateurs.  
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